Greg Detre
Monday, 05 June, 2000
Dr Tasioulas
Mill would say that utilitarianism can account for distributive justice
Ch 5 � he�s outlining the remit of justice
justice as the domain of morality which is concerned with perfect rights
there is no objective justice, only a sentiment that exists in the utilitarian framework
Brink - rights to exercise our deliberative capacities
Rawls � utilitarianism as the application of one person�s pursuit of pleasure to an aggregate of people
Mill � every agent as their own impartial spectator
paternalism + the harm principle
Rawls � Mill doesn�t succeed in incorporating justice
and you can�t have an extra high order distributive principle
incalculability of marginal utility as the utilitarian
asylum of ignorance
comparing justice as fairness with: intuitionism, perfectionism + utilitarianism (strict classical doctrine, e.g. Sidgwick)
society is right ordered (and therefore just) when its major institutions are so arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it
each man, in realising his own interests, is certainly free to balance his own losses against his own gains
we may impose a sacrifice on ourselves now for the sake of a greater advantage later
a person acts to achieve his greatest good / advance his rational ends as far as possible
now why should not society act on precisely the same principle applied to the group, and therefore regard that which is rational for one man as right for an association of men?
just as the well-being of a person is constructed from the series of satisfactions which are experienced at different moments in time and which constitute the life of the individual, so the well-being of a society is to be constructed from the fulfilment of the systems of desires of the many individuals who belong to it
just as an individual balances present and future gains against present and future losses, so a society may balance satisfactoins and dissatisfactoins between different individuals
thus the principle for society is to advance as far as possible the welfare of the group, to realise to the greatest extend the comprehensive system of desire arrived at from the desires of its members
a society is properly arranged when its institutions maxmise the net balance of satisfaction
the principle of choice for an association of men is interpreted as an extension of the principle of choice for one man
social justice is the principle of rational prudence applied to an aggregative of the welfare of the group
the right + the good �/span> the concept of the morally worth person
structure of an ethical theory: how it defines/connects the right + the good
the good is defined independently from the right
the right = that which maximises the good
teleological theories: intuitive appeal, seem to embody the idea of rationality, by maximising something
but: the good is defined independently from the right
1. equates value with the intuited good, so right is just maximising this good
2. can judge the goodness of things without referring to what is right
e.g. if pleasure is the sole good, then pleasures can be recognised + ranked in value by criteria that do not presuppose any standards of right
whereas: if the distribution of goods is also counted as a good (perhaps a higher order one), then produce the most good (including the good of distribution among others)
but then: no longer a teleological view in the classical sense
since the problem of distribution is one of right, so the theory lacks an independent definition of the good
teleological doctrines different according to conceptions of the good:
perfectionism = the realisation of human excellence in the various forms of culture (Aristotle, Nietzsche etc.)
hedonism = pleasure
eudaimonism = happiness
utilitarianism = the satisfaction of (rational) desire
it does not matter how the (maximised) sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals
(any more than it matters how one man distributes his satisfactions over time)
the correct distribution is always that which yields the maximum fulfilment
in itself, no distribution of satisfaction is better than another
common sense precepts of justice (e.g. the protection of liberties + rights, or the claims of desert) seem to contradict this
utilitarian explanation: experience shows that these should only be departed from in exceptional circumstances if the sum of advantages is to be maximised
common sense precepts of justice is useful in limiting men�s propensities to injustice and to socially injurious actions
but it is not a first principle of morals
there is no reason in principle why the violation of a liberty of a few might not be made right by the greater good shared by many
the most natural way of arriving at utilitarianism, then, is:
to adopt for society as a whole the principle of rational choice for one man
the place of the impartial spectator:
the spectator is conceived as carrying out the required organisation of the desires of all persons into one coherent system of desire
the emphasis on sympathy:
endowed with ideal powers of sympathy + imagination, the impartial spectator is the perfectly rational individual who identifies with and experiences the desires of others as if his own, and assigns them appropriate weight
the ideal legislator:
tries to maximise satisfaction by adjusting the rules of the social system
separate individuals as different lines along which right + duties are to be assigned, and scarce means of satisfaction allocated in accordance with rules to give the greatest fulfilment of wants
just as an entrepreneur decides how to maximise profit by producing this or that commodity
or a consumer decides how to maximise satisfaction by purchasing this or that collection of goods
single person: whose system of desires determines the best allocation of limited means
utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons
�impartial spectator�???
original position (� social contract)
recasts Mill�s thought in the light of deliberation, i.e. considering, planning, implementing etc. ???
considers higher pleasures as being those which require greater deliberation of us, i.e. involve our higher deliberative capacities (which are what separates us from animals)
considers liberties in the same light � the extent to which they affect our deliberative capacities
paternalism is not always impermissible
weak paternalism is defensible
the harm principle is not the sole legitimate ground for restricting liberty
various forms of social welfare legislation are acceptable
there are rights to basic liberties
but no rights to liberty per se
justice, as morality
2 levels
critical thinking
contingent empirical truths, founded on the world as it is